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BOOK REVIEWS 
Christianity and Philosophy, by Keith E. Yandell. Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984. Pp. xi and 289. $12.95. 
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College 
Yandell's book is a sustained attempt to show that religious claims can be 
rationally assessed. He does this primarily by assessing many such claims, though 
he also discusses how religious claims should be assessed (chp. 4) and provides 
some rules for assessing conceptual systems (chp. 8). The religious claims on 
which he focuses are those of theism, a position which he defends. Thus, his 
book is secondarily a defense of theism, though one he regards as inconclusive. 
It covers a broad range of topics at a sophisticated level yet with economy of 
style; though written clearly, it is not a book for beginners. It includes many 
valuable insights and useful arguments on a variety of topics, making it worth-
while even for those with some knowledge of the philosophy of religion. 
The book's concerns (both topics and methodology) are those of recent philos-
ophy of religion in the broadly analytic tradition. Yandell shows familiarity with 
recent work in that tradition, but he almost never refers explicitly to it, preferring 
instead to discuss various positions as options or possibilities without identifying 
explicitly any advocate of the position or anyone articulation of it. To some 
extent, he compensates for this absence of explicit reference through a bibliog-
raphy at the end of each chapter, but these bibliographies are too brief to provide 
a good introduction to even the current literature and consist predominantly of 
works by Christian authors and/or by authors sympathetic to Yandell's positions. 
Perhaps this is due to the book's membership in a series (Studies ill a Christian 
World View) "intended for thinking Christians who are attempting to articulate 
a Christian world view in contrast to current non-Christian world views." The 
book has no index, but instead each chapter has a very helpful analytical table 
of contents. 
Yandell's defense of the rational assessibility of religious claims and of theism 
has two parts. Since God (if God exists) is a particular object and the concept 
of God is essential to a complex conceptual system, assessment of God exists 
will involve consideration of purported experiences of God (numinous experi-
ences) and consideration of the conceptual system. He expresses the connection 
between the parts with an analogy: "As the overall plausibility of a scientific 
theory which refers to a theoretical entity x is relevant to the question of whether 
to describe experimental observations in terms of seeing an x, thereby providing 
confirmation for There are x's (the phenomenology of the experience also being 
relevant), so the overall plausibility of theism is relevant to the question of whether 
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to describe numinous experiences as experiences of God, thereby providing 
confirmation for God exists (the overall phenomenology of the numinous experi-
ence being relevant)" (42). The first chapter defends the positive evidential value 
of numinous experiences; the remainder of the book is concerned with discussions 
relating to the overall plausibility of theism without reference to numinous (or 
any specifically religious) experience. 
Topics covered in the remaining chapters include traditional arguments for the 
existence of God, the purported ineffability of God, skeptical and relativist 
attacks on the rational assessibility of religious claims, the rational assessibility 
of moral claims, the problem of evil, Yandell's proposal for a theistic ethics, 
and some rules for assessing conceptual systems. Yandell's overall conclusion 
is that though these discussions do not constitute conclusive evidence for theism, 
they do show it to be in "good epistemic position" (284). 
One might evaluate the book either in terms of its claim that religious claims 
can be rationally assessed or in terms of its arguments for theism. The entirety 
of the book is a sustained argument for the claim about rational assessibility. 
On this level, in one sense it succeeds very well. In light of the great variety of 
considerations which it adduces about many central religious claims, one would 
be very hard pressed to deny that religious claims can be rationally assessed, at 
least to some extent. But this would probably not satisfy many relativists or 
skeptics. Unless they were positivists, they probably would not deny that some 
considerations could be given pertaining to the truth or falsity of religious claims; 
rather, I suspect that they would simply say that these considerations are woefully 
underdeterminative of the truth of all the contenders and of falsity of at least 
most of the contenders for the religious allegiance of mankind. Some of the 
considerations Yandell employs (and the rules he gives) are satisfied by all the 
contenders, and whether others are satisfied is so highly controversial as to make 
it impossible to show that one particular conclusion on the matter is clearly better 
justified than all others. Nothing Yandell has said or done in this book refutes 
this criticism. Indeed, he himself admits that "for anything that has been argued 
here ... various views incompatible with theism also may be in good epistemic 
position" (284). Of course, the only way to put this objection to rest would be 
to produce an adequate justification of Christian theism (or some other system), 
and it is hardly fair to fault Yandell for not doing so, particularly in a book 
which does not attempt to do so. But unless we at least come much closer to 
doing so, we shall not have refuted (this sort of) skepticism and relativism. And 
the skeptical and relativist challenge gains even more force when one realizes 
that not only are we unable to show that only one system is clearly in good 
epistemic position, but we are often unable to show that a particular conclusion 
on any major consideration which bears on the overall issue is in any better 
epistemic position. Space does not permit arguing for this latter claim, though 
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it is worth noting that Yandell himself admits that his discussion of most of the 
issues in his book is not conclusive. But the difficulties in reaching justified 
conclusions on these matters contribute to the difficulty in showing that one 
conceptual system, in contrast to all the others, is justified. Yet showing this is 
required to make an adequate response to the challenges of skepticism and 
relativism. 
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of 
Stages, by Stephen N. Dunning. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
323 pp. + vii. $32. 
C. STEPHEN EVANS, St. Olaf College. 
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness is an original, well-written study of Kier-
kegaard as a dialectical thinker. Dunning's book is a direct challenge to the 
thesis of Niels Thulstrup (in Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel) that Kierkegaard 
owes virtually nothing to HegeL Dunning thinks that Kierkegaard's work "lends 
itself' to a systematic, structural analysis. Despite the fact that the content of 
Kierkegaard's work is so often anti-Hegelian, Dunning tries to show that the 
form of Kierkegaard's work is Hegelian or at least similar to Hegel. Of course 
from a Hegelian standpoint, at least, the relation between form and content 
suggests that the opposition to the content of Hegel's philosophy may not be so 
absolute and unqualified as many have thought. 
Dunning recognizes that there are different kinds of dialectic. He wishes to 
focus specifically on the type of dialectic exemplified in Hegel, with three 
characteristic "moments." The first moment is one characterized as "in-itself," 
and generally connotes immediacy and externality. The second, or "for itself' 
moment, is associated with reflection, inwardness, and negativity. The third or 
"in and for itself' moment, is supposed to resolve the tension between the first 
two by incorporating their "truth" and suppressing what is partial and one-sided 
in each. This third moment then begins the cycle anew. 
After an initial look at The Concept of Irony as an illustration of what is meant 
by dialectical thinking, and as evidence that Kierkegaard was trained in this kind 
of thinking, Dunning embarks on an analysis of the theory of the stages on life's 
way, as this theory is exemplified in the pseudonymous authorship from Either-Or 
to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In typical Hegelian fashion Dunning 
finds tripartite structures within tripartite structures. The three stages are under-
stood in Hegelian fashion. Each stage in tum is analyzed as consisting ofthree-fold 
movements. Movements are in their tum analyzed as composed of moments, and 
